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fugitive, it would constitute a battery as to the fugitive if he were hit,
and if a bystander were hit it would be a battery as to him.'
The result in the principal case would seem to be justified also upon
the ground of negligence. Firearms are recognized by the courts as
dangerous instruments,1" and it has been generally agreed that a high
standard of care should be required of anyone using them. 4 That
standard has been determined by some courts to be a "great" degree of
care 5 and by others a "high" degree of care.'" Shooting a firearm in
a public street is obviously an act likely to produce injury. In Conradt v.
Clauve' the court held the defendant negligent where he permitted a
target range to be operated on a fairgrounds. In Combs v. Thompsoni'
the court declared that the discharge of a toy cannon in the street of the
most populous city in the state was a reckless act. In Askay v.
Maloney,'9 where the officer was lawfully engaged in pursuing a felon,
the court said that he was under a duty to use care commensurate with
the danger involved, in discharging firearms in a public street, but that
whether such degree of care was exercised or not was a question for the
jury to decide. Where, as in the principal case, the shooting was wrong-
ful in itself, it would seem that the defendant was obviously negligent
in shooting in a public street for no better reason than to frighten an
escaping misdemeanant. F.A. R.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY FOR FRIGHT
Plaintiff, a woman about fifty years old, was a passenger on defend-
ant's bus. When leaving the bus, the folding doors at the rear closed
and caught her, holding her for from thirty seconds to two minutes.
She was not bruised and suffered no apparent physical injury. Plaintiff
introduced evidence to show fright and shock resulting in mental and
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nervous disturbance, described as a major hysteria, and manifesting
itself in a paralysis of part of the plaintiff's body. Held: No liability
for fright and its consequences in a negligence action, when the fright
is unaccompanied by some contemporaneous physical injury.'
This ruling follows the case of Miller v. The Baltimore and Ohio
South Vestern Ry. Co.,2 in which the rule of non-liability for fright
in negligence actions was first laid down in Ohio. The older case
relied on the doctrines of proximate causation in denying recovery. The
recent case sets forth almost all the arguments for and against recovery
and makes stare decsis the controlling factor. By affirming the con-
servative view, Ohio is placed definitely in the conservative minority
wing in regard to recovery for the consequences of fright.
This doctrine was first announced in this country in New York
State in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co.,3 but since the turn of the
century many courts have become more liberal in regard to recovery
and have disapproved the harsh rule.
Thirteen states, among which are the largest jurisdictions, deny
recovery for the consequences of fright.4 However, courts in some of
these jurisdictions will allow recovery if there is an impact; and then
have defined impact to include, inter alia, dust in the eye;' a forcible
seating on the floor;' a slight jarring resulting to a passenger from an
automobile accident.'
Many jurisdictions, twenty in all, will allow recovery when there
is no contemporaneous physical injury and no impact, but only the
resulting physical consequences of fright.' While the first English case
denied recovery,' this rule has been changed, and England has permitted
recovery for the last thirty-eight years."0
The trend of decisions since the Mitchell case in 1896 has been
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definitely in favor of recovery in this type of case. Courts have granted
recovery when defendant's negligence consisted of including a dead rat
in a package of groceries, causing plaintiff to faint;" where defendant
negligently shot a dog in plaintiff's presence, causing fright and subse-
quent miscarriage. 2 And in a recent case, a Nebraska court went
farther than any court had previously gone in allowing recovery. There
the defendant's negligence consisted in selling unlabeled poisoned bran,
which caused death of buyer's cows and loss of dairy business. Subse-
quent mental and nervous shock because of worry over loss of dairy
business and fear of communicating poison to dairy customers, resulted
in buyer's death from decompensating heart. Recovery was allowed
for injuries both to person and property.'" In this case, there was fear
not of personal injury, but only of injury to business and yet recovery
was granted.
In the face of the fact that the Ohio rule, as laid down in the
principal case, is more conservative than that adopted by any court in
a recent decision, in denying recovery for injuries resulting from fright
even when there is a physical impact, it is interesting to note that Judge
Zimmerman in the principal case cites with approval the test of the
more liberal Texas court, as set out in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Hayter. 
4
It would seem that the court had a fine opportunity to follow the
more liberal trend in at least allowing recovery if there is a contempor-
aneous impact, as some of the more conservative courts have done in
attempting to soften the rigors of the rule. Ohio's rule is now even
more harsh than that followed in New York in the Mitchell case. The
Ohio court justifies the narrow rule with the statement that "when
right of recovery for fright and its effects is made dependent upon the
sustaining of a contemporaneous physical injury, such injury should be
of sufficient gravity to bear some causal relation or proximate relevance
to the fright and its consequences." If theories of proximate cause
justify the result, the reasoning is sound. But most courts following
the minority doctrine rest their conclusions upon expediency alone, and
hold that there is too much danger of fictitious claims, unless some
safeguards are established. The requirement of an impact, such as
being caught in the door as in the principal case, would seem to furnish
a satisfactory safeguard even without a resulting physical injury.
J.W.L.
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